3. The Person in Process Thought
Another approach to theological anthropology comes from
scholars writing from a Whiteheadian perspective, which Barbour compares with
four other perspectives on the mind/body problem: It is in sharp contrast to both dualism (with sources in Plato, Augustine,
Descartes and current support from Sir John Eccles, Karl Popper) and reductive
materialism (with sources in the Greek atomists, the French Enlightenment, and
current support from behaviorists, e.g., B. F. Skinner, Gilbert Ryles,
epiphenomenalists, and neural identity theorists, e.g., Herbert Feigl and J. J.
C. Smart). It is less sharply opposed to two-aspect theories (including
parallelism, e.g., Leibtniz, Spinoza, ordinary language theorists, e.g., P. F.
Strawson, and alternative language theorists, e.g., MacKay). It shares much in
common with multilevel theories (e.g., Roger Sperry) particularly in their use
of emergence and supervenience, and a commitment to the person as a
psychosomatic unity. Still, the process view is a distinctive multilevel
theory, referred to as nondualistic interactionism or as
panexperientialism. Here subjective experience is attributed (though in
appropriately attenuated forms) to unified entities at all levels of nature,
though consciousness requires a central nervous system.
Barbour finds such a view to be highly congenial to the
Biblical perspective, where humanity is rooted in nature, sharing the finitude,
creatureliness, and death of all living things. Thus humanity is part of
nature, but a unique part, both the product of a long evolutionary history and
yet with unparalleled abilities such as language, self-consciousness, and at
least limited freedom. Terms such as body, mind and spirit refer to aspects of
a personal unity, not a body-soul dualism. Moreover, we are
persons-in-community, constituted by our relations and joined together in
covenant. An understanding of the person as a psychosomatic or multileveled
unity is consistent with both science and religion: thus humans are both a
biological organism and a responsible self.Barbour returned to these themes in recent writings, showing in particular how
the findings of the neurosciences and computer science are consistent with a
theological view of the person described above, drawing on Michael Arbibs
schema theory, Joseph LeDouxs work on emotions, and Leslie Brothers research
on the neural bases of social interaction.Human capacities outstrip those of computers, since they rely on embodiment,
learning, socialization and emotion. Concepts such as information, dynamic
systems, hierarchical levels, and emergence relate artificial intelligence and
the neurosciences to a theology of the person, particularly when set within the
framework of process philosophy
Turning to the problem of sin, Barbour draws Biblical
support for the claim that death is not a divine punishment for sin (against a
literal reading of the Fall), nor is God responsible for suffering in nature
(thus avoiding both natural evil and some forms of theodicy).Rather, in an evolutionary world, death is necessary for life, and pain comes
with sentience. On the other hand, sin is the result of human choice, not from
the structures of the world for which God is responsible. In all its forms,
including (with reference to Tillich) estrangement from others, from our true
selves, from God, and (Barbour adds) from nonhuman nature, sin is a violation
of relatedness whose effects are compounded by social injustice (the
Niebuhrian meaning of original sin). Adams fall in an evolutionary context
thus represents the universal human journey from innocence to responsibility
and sin. Barbour is
sharply critical of reductionist philosophies invoked to account for both human
experience and the broader evolutionary context, including those of Dawkins and
Wilson. Instead,
he adopts a process perspective which underscores the importance of
temporality, the interconnection of events, an organic view of reality, and the
combination of efficient causation (or receptive or physical pole),
self-causation (or mental pole), and divine (or final) causation for every
new event in the world.
In a similar move, Charles Birch calls for a metaphysics for
biological organisms which includes their mental as well as physical aspects.It must account for both changes in the external relations of organisms as
objects and the internal relations of organisms as subjects. Consequently he
rejects both emergence (since the mental cannot emerge from the physical) and
reductionism (since the mental cannot be ignored). God interacts with
individual entities by offering them saving possibilities for their future.
Creatures respond to Gods feeling for the world, and God responds with
infinite passion, taking them into the divine life. Writing together, he and
John Cobb, Jr. stress the continuity between the inorganic and organic, and
point to life as a metaphysical principle grounded in God.
Contributed by: Dr. Robert Russell
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