Russell, Robert John. Divine Action and Quantum Mechanics: A Fresh Assessment."
Robert John Russell develops
and extends the thesis that, if one interprets quantum mechanics
philosophically as pointing to ontological indeterminism, then one can
construct a robust bottom-up, noninterventionist, approach to objective,
mediated, direct divine action. In this approach, Gods indirect acts at the
macroscopic level, understood as both general and special providence, arise in
part from Gods direct action at the quantum level. God sustains the
deterministic time-development of elementary processes governed by the
Schrödinger equation, and God also brings about irreversible interactions that
are not described by the Schrödinger equation (i.e., measurements) and that
can lead to specific macroscopic effects. Thus divine action ultimately results
in the regularities of our everyday world, which we attribute to general
providence and describe by the laws of physics, and in specific macroscopic
events which we view as acts of special providence.
Russell begins with
clarifications and comments on methodology. His thesis does not explain how God
acts or constitute an argument that God acts, but merely shows theological
coherence of his theory of divine action with natural science. It is neither an
epistemic nor an ontological God of the gaps argument. It does not reduce God
to a natural cause; instead, Gods action is hidden from science. It does not
propose that God alters the wavefunction between measurements or other such
views. It opts for a bottom-up approach, since this seems the best way to
discuss Gods action during the billions of years from the early universe to
the evolution of primitive organisms on Earth; when sentient life is
considered, bottom-up and top- down approaches should be combined. Finally, he
responds to two questions. First, why should we take quantum mechanics
seriously if it will one day be replaced? His response is that our alternative,
classical physics, is wrong as a fundamental theory, and its depiction of
nature as a closed causal system has already been thoroughly explored
theologically. Second, how can we use quantum mechanics theologically if it can
be given multiple philosophical interpretations? His response is that every
scientific theory is open to multiple interpretations and that this poses a
problem for all theological engagements with science. The key is that
constructive theology can take a what if strategy, exploring the implications
of one particular interpretation to its fullest without incurring the
foundationalist problems of natural or physico-theology. Here he explicitly
works within the Copenhagen indeterminist approach.
Next Russell turns to the
measurement problem from the perspective of the Copenhagen interpretation. He
distinguishes between the time development of the wavefunction governed by the
deterministic Schrödinger equation, and the irreversible interactions between a
quantum system and other systems to which the Schrödinger equation does not
apply. Such interactions are routinely called measurements, but he claims
their scope is much wider than usually acknowledged. It includes: micro-macro
(e.g., the absorption of a photon by the retina), micro- meso (e.g., the
capture of an electron by an interstellar dust particle), and irreversible
micro-micro (e.g., proton-proton scattering in the presence of heavy nuclei)
interactions, though it does not include reversible micro-micro interactions
(e.g., proton-proton scattering in free space). The phrase the collapse of the
wavefunction is used loosely to suggest what happens during a measurement,
where the inapplicability of the Schrödinger equation and thus intrinsic
unpredictability is taken as pointing to ontological indeterminism. The term
quantum event can be defined as referring to this collection of ideas related
to irreversible interactions.
Turning to theological
issues, Russell first argues that quantum statistics (Bose-Einstein and
Fermi-Dirac), as well as the Schrödinger time evolution and irreversible interactions,
together lead to the classical world we interpret via general providence. He
weighs arguments for viewing special divine action as either ubiquitous or
episodic and concludes that pervasive is more helpful. He proposes that the
spatial and temporal characteristics of the wavefunction and its collapse in an
irreversible interaction point to divine action as both global and local.
Finally he discusses scientific and theological challenges raised by special
relativity, suggesting that we need a richer theological conceptuality of time
and eternity.
He then discusses four
crucial theological issues. First, does God act providentially in all quantum
events, or only in some? Russell prefers the first option, though there are
advantages and disadvantages to both. Second, if divine action and mind/brain
top-down causality are both operative in acts of human volition, how do we
avoid what Russell calls somatic over determination? Russell suggests that
God acts in all quantum events until the rise of life and consciousness, after
which God limits Gods action, leaving room for top-down, mind/brain causality.
Third, why doesnt God act to minimize suffering, disease, death, and
extinction in nature? Russell proposes that we can give a more persuasive
response to theodicy if we move from creation theology (and thus providence) to
a trinitarian theology of redemption, particularly as developed by Wolfhart
Pannenberg. This, in turn, leads to Russells fourth issue, which he sees as
the crucial challenge to the theology-and-science discussion today: the meaning
and intelligibility of the resurrection and eschatology in light of physics and
cosmology.
Russells essay includes an
appendix on philosophical problems in quantum mechanics, including a proposed
architecture of philosophical issues, a discussion of Bells theorem, and a
comparison of nonlocality and (in)determinism in Bohm and Bohrs
interpretations of quantum mechanics.
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