|
The most important word
in this question is “appropriate,” for it implies that religious traditions and
communities are capable of making inappropriate contributions to the public
debate on embryonic stem cell research. Yet before we can begin to identify the
difference between what is an appropriate and inappropriate contribution, I
think we first need to spend some time on defining what we mean by “public,”
and describing what type of debate we should be endeavoring to undertake.
What is “public” is not restricted to legislation, legal
jurisdiction, activities conducted by governmental agencies or are tax funded.
This would mean accepting a very narrow understanding of what is public (as
well as what the public is), thereby constraining both the breadth and depth
over the morality of embryonic stem cell research.
Rather, a public is
comprised of a highly complex nexus of various forms, or social spheres, of
human association. These associations may be voluntary or non-voluntary,
relatively large or small, formal or informal, highly institutionalized or
loosely knit together. Some of these associations may be self-contained, while
others are closely related. Moreover, virtually every individual lives in a
series of these overlapping associations.
I lift up this image of a
series of human associations or social spheres to remind us that public life
(and the life of the public) is not simply a relationship between the state and
its individual citizens. It is instead mediated by relationships and
institutions which comprise civil society. It is within and among such
associations as families, religious communities, charitable organizations,
corporations and the like (associations which in the US have oddly come to be
perceived as “private”) that virtues and values are formed which either serve
us well or badly in forming the contours of our common, public life. We learn
how to be a public in our daily interactions with neighbors near and far, as
well as in addressing political and policy issues.
Consequently, the two
most appropriate contributions that religious communities and traditions can
offer to the public debate on embryonic stem cell research are as follows:
First, religious
communities should keep in mind and remind others of the larger or more
expansive public context in which this debate over embryonic stem cell research
is being conducted. Admittedly, this debate will be conducted largely with
legislators, government agencies, and the courts in mind. Enacting suitable
legislation, establishing just policies, and setting legal precedents are
certainly important tasks. And religious communities (as well as individuals
motivated by religious faith) certainly have a right to influence the course
and outcomes of these events. There is much at stake in the laws, policies, and
procedures that will delineate and govern this research.
But this is not the only
venue in which this debate can or should be conducted. It is not only laws,
policies, and procedures that will effect us. Rather, the very manner in which
this debate is conducted will have a formative influence on the human
associations comprising civil society, as well as our very perception of what
it means to be a public. The rhetoric we employ, for example, to describe what
an embryo is and what it is not, or how it is related or not related to larger
dimensions of human communities will shape our perceptions of the relative
strength or weakness of the biological bonds that bind people together, as well
as the moral duties and obligations accompanying those bonds. It seems to me
that it does make a difference if we come to perceive (at least some) embryos
as being more akin to property that can be used, exchanged, or otherwise
developed for purposes unrelated to procreation, as opposed to perceiving
embryos as in some sense already related to or a part of the human communities
which have created them.
Again, I want to be clear
that I am not suggesting that issues concerning legislation, policies, and
funding are trivial or unimportant. But the largely procedural rhetoric that
discussions of these issues entail cannot provide an adequate basis for public
moral debate that the gravity of embryonic stem cell research requires. Perhaps
the most important role religious communities and traditions can play in this
debate is to offer richer and deeper vocabularies that take into account a more
expansive vision of the life of the public to describe what we are endeavoring
to do, and what foreseen and unforeseen consequences we might achieve, in the
research now envisioned. In this respect, I believe that religious communities
can offer alternative accounts of the bonds of human communities other than a
thinly conceived notion of a social contract that can all too easily exclude
something like an embryo as an irrelevant consideration in pursuing healthcare
goals and objectives.
The second appropriate
contribution that religious communities can offer is that they express in as
clear and forthright manner as possible the principal beliefs, convictions, and
claims that inform their moral assessment of embryonic stem cell research. I
realize that I am running counter to the common sense wisdom of our day which
insists that it is precisely these larger and divisive declarations that need
to be excluded from the public arena. As Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin
contend it is turning to “matters of principle” that stifles public moral
debate on highly controversial issues. We are better off concentrating on specific objectives and fair procedures for
achieving them. By encouraging religious communities to focus on normative
beliefs and convictions, we are also submitting ourselves to the “tyranny of
principles” because we will become bogged down in interminable and irresolvable
debates over such contentious issues as when life begins or when is personhood
present. Individuals are, of course, free to hold whatever private opinions or
beliefs they may choose about these issues, but they are not admissible for the
sake of public deliberation.
Rather, we must create a
bland or neutral public vocabulary, reflecting what John Rawls describes as an
“overlapping consensus” on a set of minimalist and largely unspoken values.In respect to stem cell research, for instance, you and I may disagree over the
moral status of the embryo but agree that such research will result in the
development of highly beneficial therapies. Consequently, our task is to hammer
out policies regulating this research that we can, through the give and take of
compromise, both live with while avoiding any distracting discussion of our
disparate views on the moral status of embryos. As Rawls admits, this results
in a rather thin or diminished understanding of our life together as a public,
but it is the best we can do in a highly diverse or pluralistic society.
Although I acknowledge
that there are short-tern advantages in this approach for addressing policy
questions in an expeditious manner, I fear the costs are too great in terms of
long-term consequences. Over time, the so-called public square becomes
increasingly vacuous as more and more complex issues are reduced to the lowest
possible common denominator among an increasingly diverse range of private
interests. Indeed, the very nature of public moral deliberation becomes
transformed from assessing the veracity of competing claims and arguments, to
concocting the best strategy for silencing one’s opponents while marshaling
support from as wide a coalition of interests as possible. Or to paraphrase
Alasdair MacIntyre, it is waging civil war with words (or better, slogans and
sound bytes) rather than weapons.
What is lost in this
scenario is the possibility that the process of public moral debate itself
might lead to discovering something previously unknown that might alter,
broaden, or deepen our understanding of our life together as a public, or the
life of those communities and associations which comprise. Nor is the
possibility entertained that through public deliberation we might actually
encounter a truth that would require us to refrain from doing something despite
the clamoring of public opinion.
In practical terms, I do
not think that those entering the public debate over embryonic stem cell
research have done so with an assumption that they might be persuaded to change
their minds, or that they will change the opinions of their opponents. Rather,
they enter the fray by searching for a strategy that will most effectively mute
their opponents’ claims, while simultaneously appealing to those who at present
remain undecided. Under these circumstances, the best role a religious
community could play is to offer spiritual aid and comfort to those partisans
attempting to shape public opinion which best approximates its particular
beliefs and convictions.
It may be objected that
my admittedly uncharitable characterization of the current state of public
moral discourse is not as bleak as I portray it to be. Although a pluralistic
society necessitates a relatively thin or minimalist understanding of our life
together as a public, we are compensated by potentially rich moral lives of
private communities and associations. The procedural character of public moral
deliberation does not necessarily diminish the quality of the normative
commitments and values that we share with like minded people.
Yet this reassuring
objection assumes that the quality of public life, however thin it might be, is
unrelated to the normative convictions of the human associations and religious
communities that comprise civil society. The objection fails to recognize that
the vitality of public life is proportional to the strengths of these
associations and communities, and to insist that they strip themselves of their
core convictions in their interactions with one another is ultimately to
diminish the life of the public they are seeking to form. Moreover, the alleged
value neutrality of this type of public moral discourse may very well have a
corrosive influence on the vitality of so-called private moral life. If
religious communities, for instance, want to influence legislation or policy
formulation governing embryonic stem cell research, will they not be sorely
tempted to reformulate their normative claims embryos in terms that lend
themselves more easily to manipulating the trends of public opinion rather than
reflecting a depth and breadth of conviction? And is succumbing to such a
temptation ultimately an injustice, because we do not take those outside our
communities with enough seriousness to honestly share what is believed to be
good, and right, and true?
Do I have any reason to
believe that if religious communities take my advice the public debate over the
morality of embryonic stem cell research will be qualitatively any different
than what has occurred in the recent past? I have read too much Augustine to be
overly optimistic, but I think it is nonetheless worth the effort. I hope it is
recorded that in this debate that we are now entering, at least some religious
communities chose to argue from the strength of their convictions rather than
strategic or tactical considerations for swaying public opinion. And
furthermore this approach was adopted not to trump the opposition but to
designed to promote a conversation resulting in a richer fabric of public moral
discourse. For it would be a conversation requiring attentive and disciplined
listening, as well as taking the risk of having a community’s convictions
transformed and possibly enrich in the process.
I believe such an alternative
is particularly needed in the case of embryonic stem cell research. For if
embryos come to be popularly perceived, at least partially, as biological or
medical commodities, the already fragile bonds that bind us together as a
public (especially in regard to its weakest and most vulnerable members) will
be further strained. Or in short, the most appropriate contribution that
religious traditions and communities can offer in this debate is to insist that
we not rush too quickly to plunder embryos for their healthcare benefits. And
playing this important role requires a strength of conviction rather than an
effective political strategy.
|
