Non-Reductive Physicalism Complex structures or concepts can have irreducibly non-physical properties, such as consciousness and will. Related Topics: Philosophy Contributed by: CTNS

So option number three (Physicalism) actually hides two very different views here: A reductive view of physicalism or materialism and a non-reductive view of materialism or physicalism. First of all, I want to try to make that distinction

now to talking about a non-reductive view not of life but of the mental, and you can probably guess where I'm going here. There's a perfect analogy between what the non-reductive physicalist wants to say about the mental and what the

Still naturalism (or physicalism) can be non-reductive in the sense that higher level properties may require their own concepts and explanatory schemes. Evolutionary explanations are primarily functional. He argues that such a naturalism

set out to try to develop a non-reductive view of physicalism. Now, to do that, I'm going to start by thinking about the sciences.  And, in particular, I want you to think about how the various physical sciences fit together.  You may have

now to talking about a non-reductive view not of life but of the mental, and you can probably guess where I'm going here. There's a perfect analogy between what the non-reductive physicalist wants to say about the mental and what the

set out to try to develop a non-reductive view of physicalism. Now, to do that, I'm going to start by thinking about the sciences. And, in particular, I want you to think about how the various physical sciences fit together. You may have mused

The emergent-monism/non-reductive physicalism of Clayton, Murphy and Peacocke head in this direction. Others see the problem as intractable. Russell Stannard sees no easy way to reconcile our experience of self and the passage of