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Some scholars in theology and science, while accepting the
preceding arguments for an epistemic hierarchy of disciplines, reject the
foundationalist assumption that often accompanies it. Foundationalism is one of
the central characteristics of the modern period. It is the assumption that,
like the foundations of a building, undeniable facts (following Humean
empiricism) or clear and distinct ideas (following Cartesian idealism)
provide an indubitable foundation for all of knowledge in each discipline; from
them all other epistemic claims within a discipline, or even between them, must
be deduced or justified.
In its place, Murphy, for example, adopts W. V. O. Quines
non-foundationalist or holist approach. Here systems of knowledge are pictured
more like a web or net than a building, with each level in the hierarchy of
disciplines forming its own web. Core theories that characterize each
discipline lie at the center of the web; they are indirectly connected to the
edge of the web and its ties to the appropriate facts and experiences. As
before, both constraint and emergence operate between the disciplines.
Contributed by: Dr. Robert Russell
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