The Inferior ETI Slice
If the alien intelligence we Earthlings find ourselves
engaging with is substantially inferior to ours, then we must ask: how should we
morally respond? One obvious analogy leads us to ask: how do we on Earth treat
our intelligent neighbors whom we similarly designate as lower on the
intelligence scale? Im talking about our animals.
On the one hand, animals are edible and dispensable. Animals
can be sacrificed in medical research to develop therapies that will benefit only
human persons. Animals are less than human, we assume. On the other hand, we
human beings have a sense of responsibility toward the welfare of animals. We
respect them as intelligent being. And we are concerned about preventing
suffering to animals. In some instances, we exert considerable energy and
effort to preserve their species from extinction and to insure the health of
individual animals. In the case of pets, we love them to a degree that rivals
loving our own family. In sum, we have inherited a double relationship to our
inferiors already here on earth. By analogy, what might we expect when we
engage ETI who remind us of our animals?
Important for our application to the upcoming ETI question
is what we have assumed to be our ethical criterion for rendering moral policy.
Is the animal rational in the same sense that we homo sapiens are rational? No, says the tradition beginning with
Aristotle. The human is the distinctively
rational animal. The separation of humanity from the animal world due to a
separation on the scale of rational intelligence justifies an ethic whereby the
superior human exploits the inferior animal. Irrational animals are natural
slaves, and no positive human moral or political categories can govern
humankinds relations with them (Fellenz, 1:75). Yet, we might ask: is
rational intelligence the only ethical criterion? No, say some moralists. Feeling
counts too. We rational humans have a moral responsibility to care for less
intelligent sentient beings. By extension, our moral commitment to protect
humans from suffering should be applied to animals. How an animal feels is
morally significant. Animal welfare is most crucially a matter of the animals
subjective experience - how the animal feels, whether it is in pain or suffering
in any way (Rollin, 1:82).
With this double sided experience of relating to animals
on Earth in mind, our first ethical question in the case of engagement with
inferior ETI would be: by which criterion do we orient our ethics? Should we justify
the exploitation of ETI on the grounds of its lower intelligence? Or should our
responsibility for the welfare of ETI take precedence? Now, we could ask the
question another way. Which of these two habits should we set as our moral
standard: exploitation of ETI for our own use? Or protection of ETI from
suffering? More than likely, all of these alternatives would inform the
policies we develop.
Even if we earthlings commit ourselves to caring for the
alien as other, we would not impute dignity to ETI whose level of rational
advance falls significantly short or ours. We very well might show them respect
along with care, to be sure. If motivated by faith, we might view ETI as
creatures precious in the eyes of God. If we look at inferior ETI through
economic glasses, more than likely we would exploit lesser intelligent ETI for
increased terrestrial prosperity. We might work out terms of exchange, or, more
likely, simply set up an infrastructure for ongoing exploitation. Would we
exploit with moral abandon? Or, would we exploit only to the limit set at the
point of detriment to the welfare of the ETI themselves?
All this presses on the matter of our moral
responsibility. In terms of our responsibility, I believe we should take the
initiative to extend concern for the welfare of such ETI on the model of our
current concern for the subjective quality of animal experience. We should do what
we are able to protect ETI from suffering and enhance their experience of
wellbeing. This trumps exploitation, though it would not entirely exclude it.
Printer-friendly | Contributed by: Ted Peters
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